Mike Waltz somehow got worse to use signal

On Thursday, Reuters published a photo Representation of the then national security consultant of the states, Mike Waltz, checks his phone during a cabinet session of President Trump in the White House. If you enlarge the part of the image that records the Waltz screen, it seems to show it with the end-to-end encryption measuring app signal. However, if you take a closer look, a notification on the screen refers to the app as a “TM SGNL”. During a cabinet to the White House on Wednesday, Waltz apparently used an Israeli app called Telemessage Signal with people who seem to be the US officials, including JD Vance, Marco Rubio and Tulsi Gabbard.

After members of the Senior Trump Administration Cabinet used displaced signal messages to coordinate military strikes in Yemen -and accidentally included the editor -in -chief of the Atlantic in the group chat -the “Signal Gate” scandal highlighted Regarding violations of the traditional government “Operational Security” protocol as well as Compliance problems with federal recording laws. At the center of the debacle, Waltz, which was displaced by Trump as US National Security Adviser on Thursday. Waltz created the chat “Houthi PC Small Group” and was the member who added the Top Atlantic editor Jeffrey Goldberg. “I take full responsibility. I built the group,” Waltz told Fox News at the end of March. “We have the best technical minds that have happened how it happened,” he added at the time.

Signal gate had nothing to do with signal. The app worked normally and was simply used for an inappropriate time for an incredibly sensitive discussion that should have been carried out on special, hardened federal devices and software platforms. However, if you fled the protocols, the signal (relatively) is a good place to do this, since the app is designed so that only the senders and recipients of messages can read in a group chat. And the app is created in order to collect information about your users and your employees as little as possible. This means that spies or malicious hackers could only access the devices of the participants through direct compromises – a challenge that is potentially overwhelming, but at least limited at least possible access points if we were entertaining in the app, only through the direct compromises of the participants. With an app such as Telemessage signal, however, there is probably an attempt to meet the requirements for database, numerous other paths for opponents to access messages.

“I don’t even know where to start with it,” says Jake Williams, former NSA hacker and Vice President for Research and Development at Hunter Strategy. “It is stunning that the federal government uses Israeli technology to direct extremely sensitive data for archive purposes.

Telemessage was founded in Israel in 1999 by former technologists from the Israeli defense forces and ran out of the country until it was acquired last year Through the archiving company Smarsh based in the USA. The service creates duplicates of communication apps that are equipped with a “mobile archiver” tool to record and save messages that are sent via the app.

“Capture, Archive and Monitor Mobile Communication: SMS, MMS, voice calls, WhatsApp, Wechat, Telegram & Signal,” says Telemessage on his website. For Signal, it adds: “Signs and record signal calls, texts, multimedia and files on BYOD telephones issued by companies. (BYOD stands for Bring your own device.) In other words Signal app functions and functions as well as the signal encryption can be managed “and adds that the app contains” End-to-end encryption from mobile phone to the company archive “. However, the existence of” corporate archives “undermines the privacy and safety of the end-to-end encryption.